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Executive Summary 
Congress passed the Medicare Modernizati
(MMA) in 2003 in response to the difficulty that 
many seniors faced in paying for prescription 
drugs.
1 However, it was not designed in a way to 
maximize efficiency. Instead, Congress 
deliberately designed the bill in way that would 
ensure that private insurance com
provide the benefit instead of the Medicare 
administration or a single desi
This design both substan
of drugs and administrative costs in addition to 
making the drug program much more 
complicated for beneficiaries.  
 
This paper uses data from the Congressional 
Bud
the savings from a drug b
centrally administered as an add-on to the 
traditional Medicare program. These pro
show that: 
 
• In an alternative high-cost scenario, in which 
the Medicare system pays as much for drugs as 
the highest cost country examined by CBO, the 
savings on drug prices during the initial 2006-
2013 budget period would be $332 billion 
compared with the cost of the MMA. In the 
case of a middle cost sce
Medicare paid the same prices
country in the CBO analysis, the savings over 
this bu
 
• CBO projected that the marketing and the 
profits of the insurance industry add $38 billion 
to the cost of the MMA over this seven-year 
budget window. If Congress had instead created 
an add-on benefit to the e
program, this money either c
used to create a more genero
                  
 
on Act  financ
panies would 
gnated provider. 
tially increased the cost 
get Office (CBO) and other sources to project 
enefit program that is 
jections 
nario, in which 
 as the lowest cost 
dget window would be $563 billion. 
 
The paper not
substantial savings from having 
negotiate prices directly with the pharm
xisting Medicare 
ould have been 
us benefit or to 




assumed the insurers would be paying un
1 The analysis in this paper is similar to the analysis in Sager, 
A. and D. Socolar, 2003. “61 Percent of Medicare’s New 
Prescription Drug Subsidy is Windfall Profit to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry,” Boston, MA: Boston University 
School of Public Health 
[http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/hs/Medicare_Rx_bill_windfallpr
ofit.pdf]. 
e federal and state spending in other 
areas. 
 
• The projected combined savings from lower 
ug costs and l er administrative fees are 
large enough in the middle-cost scenario to 
low for the government to fully cover the 
rojected cost of prescription drugs for 
Medicare beneficiaries over this budget window, 
d still leave a surplus of almost $40 billion 
compared with the projected spending under 
e MMA. 
 
Alternatively, if beneficiaries only paid the 
premiums projected under the MMA (with no co-
payments or deductibles) the savings in the 
middle cost scenario would be large enough to 
allow the states to keep the $88.5 billion they are 
required to pay under the maintenance of effort 
provisions of the MMA, and still save the federal 
government $80 billion compared to its projected 
spending on the MMA. In short, the savings from 
designing a more efficient drug benefit are large 
enough that they could provide for substantial 
gains to both the federal and state governments 
and Medicare beneficiaries compared to the 
projected costs under the MMA. 
es that CBO has reported to 
Congress that it will not be possible to incur 
Medicare 
aceutical 
industry, because its projections already assume 
that the insurance companies involved in the 
MMA will secure substantial price reductions 
from the industry. The paper points out that this 
radicted by CBO’s analysis 
ign countries, as well as the 
ration, pay substantially lower 
prices for drugs than the prices that CBO 
der the 
MMA. CBO has provided no reason for believing 
that Medicare, given its enormous potential 
market power, would be unable to negotiate the 
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The paper also notes that CBO ha
made serious projection errors in 
s occasionally 
the past on 
important public policy questions. At the time 
ax policy in 2001. 
imilarly, since CBO has no obvious justification 
egotiate drug prices directly with the 
harmaceutical industry.    
that President Bush’s tax cuts were being debated 
in 2001, CBO apparently failed to recognize the 
stock bubble and the inevitable crash. As a result 
of this failure, CBO made projections of capital 
gains tax revenue that overstated collections over 
the budget horizon by more than $450 billion, 
compared with actual history and the most recent 
projections.  
 
Given an overstatement of revenue projections of 
this magnitude, Congress would have been better 
served if it had found alternatives to CBO’s 
projections when it debated t
S
for its assertion that Medicare could not negotiate 
prices as low as those in other countries, or those 
negotiated by the Veterans Administration, 
Congress would be better served by alternative 
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Introduction 
 
When Congress passed a Medicare prescription dr
the government and beneficiaries was not the prim
the bill so as to ensure a role for private insure
purpose.
2 It also prohibited direct negotiation be
industry, which would have led to lower prices as a 
power. As a result, the combined cost of the 
beneficiaries and the government is substantially gre
 
ug benefit in 2003, minimizing costs for 
ary concern. Instead, Congress structured 
rs and even added in subsidies for this 
tween Medicare and the pharmaceutical 
result of Medicare’s enormous bargaining 
Medicare prescription drug benefit to 
ater than necessary. 
n addition, the role of competing insurers can make the plan more complicated for 
me the opportunity to choose between 
, many beneficiaries may find this process 
d disadvantages of various plans may be 
an change their benefits after a plan has 
 drugs may change as well, as their health 
s sense, the need to choose a plan can be 
be necessary if Medicare simply offered a 
easons for designing the Medicare drug 
ublic have an accurate assessment of the 
turing the benefit in a more efficient way. These savings could be 
ivided between lower costs to the federal government, reducing the cost to state 
governments, and providing a more generous benefit. 
 
This paper projects the financial savings that would result from having a simple add-on drug 
benefit to the basic Medicare package. Using data from the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) and other sources, it projects separately the savings that could potentially result from 
having Medicare negotiate prices directly with drug companies and the savings from having a 
single designated administrator of the program, instead of insurance companies. It then 




                                                
I
beneficiaries. While some beneficiaries may welco
different plans in the hopes of finding a better deal
to be quite complicated. The relative advantages an
difficult to recognize, especially since the insurers c
been selected. Furthermore, beneficiaries’ needs for
condition changes over the course of a year. In thi
an additional cost for beneficiaries that would not 
basic add-on plan.  
 
While there were clearly political and ideological r
benefit in its current form, it is important that the p
potential savings from struc
d
 
2 The Office of Management and Budget assumed that the subsidies associated with the “Medicare Advantage” 
program, which facilitates entry by private insurers into the Medicare program, would total $46 billion over the 
original 2004-2013 budget window. CBO projected that Medicare Advantage program would lead to $14 billion 
in public subsidies. The main reason for the difference is that CBO assumed lower enrollment rates in the 
Medicare Advantage program (CBO, 2004. “Comparison of CBO and Administration Estimates of the Effect 
of H.R. 1 on Direct Spending,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office 
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4995&sequence=0].    
…the combined 
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Savings From Having Medicare Negotiate Prices  
 
er prices than it does 
t present.  
n surveying the prices that various countries pay for drugs, CBO found costs ranged from 35 
his range of prices can be used to construct projections for the discounts that Medicare 
                                              
The most obvious potential source of savings from designing a more efficient Medicare drug 
benefit would stem from having Medicare, or a designated pharmacy manager, negotiate 
prices directly with the pharmaceutical industry. Such negotiations should in principle allow 
for very substantial reductions in price, because the pharmaceutical industry sells prescription 
drugs for prices that are typically more than 200 percent above their cost of production. This 
means that if a large buyer, like Medicare, were to demand substantial discounts, then the 
industry could still make a profit on its sales, even if it charged much low
a
 
This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that other buyers, most notably foreign governments 
and the Veterans Administration, are able to secure prices that are much lower than what 
consumers pay in the United States. The pharmaceutical industry must at least cover its 
production costs and make a normal profit on even the lowest price drug sales to other 
countries or agencies, otherwise it would not make them. Therefore, if Medicare were able to 
bargain for drug prices collectively on behalf of its beneficiaries, it should be able to secure a 




to 55 percent less than the prices paid in the United States (CBO, 2004a, p 4).
4 This is 
consistent with a wide range of other studies that have found prices paid by other countries, 
as well as the Veterans Administration and purchases through the Federal Supply Schedule, 




could receive if it negotiated as a single buyer with the pharmaceutical industry. This range is 
conservative, since Medicare would be a larger buyer than any of the other countries or 
agencies in this group, and therefore would have more bargaining power. As CBO noted in 
assessing the prospect of Medicare bargaining collectively on behalf of its beneficiaries 
    
would still have enough money to finance research into 
the development of new drugs if its profit margins were substantially reduced in the United States. This is a very 
important question, but the question of how best to finance drug research is a different issue from asking how 
much money can be saved if a single Medicare selected agent was allowed to negotiate collectively on behalf of 
Medicare beneficiaries. It is worth noting here that there is considerable evidence that the current system of 
patent supported research is becoming increasingly inefficient through time (e.g. Dimasi J. R. Hansen, and H. 
Grabowski, 2003. "The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs." Journal of Health 
Economics, 22: 151-185.). Baker, 2006[forthcoming]. (“The Growing Inefficiency of Patent Monopolies as a 
Mechanism for Supporting Prescription Drug Research,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy 
Research).     
4 CBO, 2004a, “Would Prescription Drug Importation Reduce U.S. Drug Spending?” Washington, D.C.: 
bsprices.pdf
3 There is an important issue about whether the industry 
Congressional Budget Office [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5406/04-29-PrescriptionDrugs.pdf].  
5 Similar analyses of relative prices in other countries can be found in U.S. Department of Commerce, 
International Trade Commission, 2004. “Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD Countries,” Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce [http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/DrugPricingStudy.pdf] and 
Australian Productivity Commission. 2001. International Pharmaceutical Price Differences, Australian Productivity 
Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, 
[http://www.pc.gov.au/research/commres/pbsprices/finalreport/p ].  





35 to 55 percent 






paid in the U
States.
nited 
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“exclusion from the Medicare market could threaten the profitability –and even the surv
of some drug manufacturers.”
6    
ival – 
ormal profit. According to the Commerce Department the average price of a 
eneric prescription is approximately 30 percent of the price of an average brand drug 
t would be 
ble to substantially reduce this growth rate. The bulk of this projected growth in average 
nding would increase only as a 
sult of an increase in the number of prescriptions per person or an increase in the size of 
                                                
 
In fact, the floor on the prices that Medicare could conceivably set would be even lower than 
the range of discounts currently being received by other countries or agencies. In principle, as 
long as drug companies can cover their production costs and earn a normal profit on their 
sales, they would profit by selling their drugs to Medicare rather than being excluded from 
this huge market. The price of generic drugs gives a reasonable basis for estimating the 
minimum price that would still be high enough for the industry to earn a profit, since 
obviously generic companies are able to produce and market their drugs at these prices and 
still earn a n
g
prescription.
7 Assuming that the brand drug manufacturers are as efficient in producing and 
distributing their drugs as the generic manufacturers, then they should also be able to make a 
profit at this price. 
 
The second key question is the rate of growth of drug prices. The CBO assumed that baseline 
per capita drug spending would rise at an average annual rate of 9.0 percent over the ten-year 
projection period.
8 If Medicare were to negotiate on behalf of its beneficiaries, i
a
prescription prices is not attributable to higher production costs, but rather a growing gap 
between prices and production costs.
9 If Medicare acted as a collective buyer of drugs, it 
could negotiate prices that reflected actual production costs. For purposes of this analysis, it 
is assumed that the average prescription price negotiated by Medicare would rise in step with 
the overall rate of inflation. This means that real drug spe
re
the Medicare population.    
 
Table 1 shows the projected cost of drugs to the Medicare population, assuming that all drugs 
are purchased at a price negotiated by Medicare or another agent acting as a single buyer 





rmal prices since it must only compete with the brand version of the drug.   
6 CBO, 2002. "Issues in Designing a Prescription Drug Benefit for Medicare," Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Budget Office [http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3960&sequence=0]. The statement goes on to warn 
that exclusion of manufacturers from formularies “might be difficult to sustain politically.”  
7 The average price for a prescription of a brand drug cost $95.86 in 2004, compared to a price of  $28.71 for an
average generic prescription (U.S. Commerce Department, Census Bureau, 2006, Statistical Abstract of the Unit
States, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Table 126). Even this number is likely to be 
somewhat inflated, since it includes generic drugs that are sold during periods of “market exclusivity.” This is 
the six-month period after the first generic drug equivalent to a brand drug enters the market. During this 
period, no other generics are allowed to enter the market, which means that the first generic will be able to set 
higher than no
8 CBO, 2004b, “A Detailed Description of CBO's Cost Estimate for the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Benefit.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office 
[http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5668&sequence=0],  p 6.  
9 The industry has justified this growing gap by noting the rapid rise in its costs for developing new drugs.  
10 The numbers are adjusted to exclude drug spending that is covered through the Veterans Administra
(VA) drug program. The CBO assumed that the VA would continue its current drug program and that Medic




its would stay in the VA program. This accounted for 15.5 percent 
f baseline spending according to the CBO (CBO, 2004b, 6).  
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Table 1 
Projected Spending on Drugs by Medicare Beneficiaries 
85  90  95  101 106 112 119 126 834 
Middle  Cost  61 65 69 73 77 81 86 91 602 
untries examined by CBO. The low-cost scenario assumes that 
edicare negotiates prices that are comparable to the prices that brand drugs would sell at if 
w for additional per person use of 
prescription drugs.   
 
These projections are adjusted to reflect the fact that lower drug prices will lead to some 






of drugs. While savings of this sort would 
           
          T o t a l  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2006-
2013 
Baseline  134 150 167 186 206 229 255 284 1611 
Baseline  minus           
Veterans 
Administration Drug 
Purchases  113 127 141 157 174 193 215 240 1361 
           
           
High  Cost 
Low  Cost  42 45 48 51 53 56 60 63 418 
           
Source: CBO and author’s calculations, see appendix.  
 
The table uses three alternative assumptions. In the high-cost case, it is assumed that the cost 
of drugs falls by 35 percent from the baseline path projected by the CBO in the absence of 
the MMA  – effectively that Medicare negotiates prices that are comparable to those in the 
highest cost country evaluated by CBO. The mid-cost scenario assumed that Medicare or the 
buying agent negotiates a price that is 55 percent lower than the baseline cost projected by 
CBO. This is equivalent to assuming that Medicare negotiates prices that are comparable to 
the lowest prices in the co
M
they were marketed as generics. In each case the growth path assumes that prices would rise 
by an amount equal to the projected growth rate of the Medicare population, plus CBO’s 
projected inflation rate, plus 1.5 percent annually to allo
beneficiaries under the MMA leads to a 10 percent increase in usage. The projection for the 
high-cost, middle-cost, and low-cost scenarios assume that lower drug prices will lead to a 15 
11 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent increases in drug usage, respectively.    
 
Table 2 shows the gross savings from this path compared to the spending path
projected for drugs under the MMA. In addition to being considerably larger than the 20-2
percent gross savings path projected by CBO from the 2003 Medicare Modernization
(CBO 2004, pp 11-14), this projection also is constructed somewhat differently. The CBO
projection includes savings that would result from insurers requiring beneficiaries to sw
lower cost drugs and also from restricting their use 
                                                 
11 These are very crude projections. Without a more precise design, it is not possible to determine how much
price reductions will be for different beneficiaries. Also, it is not clear how much can be said about the impact of 
very large changes in price on usage. Presumably, price ceases to be a major factor in determining the use for 
most drugs for many people, once it has already fallen to a low
 the 
 level.  
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still be possible even with a system where there was a single buyer, the potential gains from 
o lower cost drugs would be considerably smaller if drug prices were pushed down 
 cost savings associated with 
restricting beneficiaries’ access to medically useful drugs. CBO does not break-down the 
extent to which these restrictions, as opposed to lower drug prices obtained by insurers, 
account for their projected savings, so it is not possible to directly determine how much of 
the reductions in drug costs attributable to the MMA are due to these forms of cost control.  
 
T
Gross Savings Under MMA and Alternative Scenarios 
 
      a
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  12  013 
2006-
2013 
      
     
14 16  9 22 25 2 5 
         
1 97 114  527 
Middle 
rom only having to deal with a single insurer for drug reimbursements, 
ut such savings would be difficult to measure and are not included in this projection. CBO 
avings on Administrative Costs 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e           
C o s t s              
shifting t
closer to production costs. Similarly, there would be less
able 2 
       T o t l    
  20 2
       
         
MMA  1   9 33 38 19
 
High  Cost  29 37 46 56 68 8
Cost  52 62 72 84 97 112  130  149  758 
Low  Cost  71  82  93  107 121 137 156 177 942 
 
Source: CBO and author’s calculations, see appendix.  
 
 
Table 3 shows the savings that would result from having a single administrator of the drug 
program as opposed to having a group of private insurers, as provided for in the MMA. CBO 
directly estimated the costs attributable to having private insurers administer the program 
(2004, p 17). These are costs associated with marketing, member acquisition, and member 
retention in addition to the profit earned by the insurers. There may also be additional 
savings to providers f
b
projected these administrative costs over the original 2006-2013 planning horizon to total 
approximately $38.0 billion. This is the amount that could be saved if Medicare used a single 





          T o t a l    




on  4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 38 
Source: CBO, see appendix.  
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Table 4 combines the savings shown in Tables 2 and 3 to show projections for the total 
potential savings from having the drug plan administered by a single administrator who 
would negotiate prices directly with the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Table 4 
Total Savings Under Alternative Scenarios Relative to the MMA 
 




High  Cost  19 25 32 39 48 57 69 81 370 
iddle 
Cost  42 50 58 67 77 89 102  116 
ow  Cost 
Source: CBO and author’s calculations, see appendix.  
 
In the high-cost case, the total projected savings would be $370 billion over the original 2006-
2013 period. In the middle-cost scenario th
billion, and in the low-cost case the projected savings would be $785 billion. It is important 
t ize tha ese  gros ving n pu ases rug th dic opulation 
compared with the program put in place by  ed  M iz Ac y are not 
avings to the federal government alone.   
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
M
601 
785  L 61 70 79 89 101  113  128  144 
           
e projected savings would be more than $600 
o real t th are  s sa s o rch  of d s by  e Me are p
the M icare odern ation  t; the
s
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The Cost of an Efficient Medicare Drug Benefit  
 
Savings of the magnitude projected above would have allowed for a qualitatively different 
he CBO projected that the MMA would cost just under $400 billion in the original 
it in a more efficient 
anner could have been divided between beneficiaries and state governments, which still 
must meet maintenance of efforts requirements that offset their savings on Medicaid 
expenditures, or allowed for a substantial reduction in the cost of the benefit to the federal 
government.  
 
Table 5 shows total federal and state expenditures for prescription drugs over the years 2006-
2013 with the passage of the MMA (CBO 2004, table 1). The combined levels of state and 
f d  wo be  e en h to y c  th sts  en ries’ drug 
spending in the middle-cost scenario. This means that if the federal and state government 
the drug costs were in line with the 
rojections in the middle scenario, then beneficiaries could have their drug expenditures fully 
benefit. T
2004-2013 budget window. The savings from designing the benef
m
ederal spen ing uld  larg oug  full over e co of b eficia
followed the spending path projected by CBO and 
p
paid by Medicare, with no insurance premiums, deductibles or co-payments.  
 
Table 5 
The Cost of An Efficient Medicare Drug Benefit 
(billions of dollars) 
        
         Total
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2006 
            -2013
Gross Federal Payments   34.1  54.4 59.6 65.3 72.2 79.1 88  98.4 551.1
(includes  previous  Medicaid  payments)        
State  Payments  5.7  9.1  10  10.8 11.7 12.6 13.7 14.9 88.5 
             
Total Government 
Payments  39.8 63.5 69.6 76.1 83.9 91.7 101.7  113.3  639.6
T o t a l   D r u g   C o s t s              
High  Cost   84.6 90.0 95.2 100.9 106.2 112.3 118.9  125.9  834.0
Middle  Cost  61.1 65.0 68.8 72.9 76.7 81.1 85.9 91.0 602.5
Low  Cost    42.4 45.2 47.8 50.6 53.3 56.3 59.6 63.2 418.4
             
Beneficiaries'  Premiums    9.1  12.8 14.3 15.5 17  18.5 20.6 22.9 130.7
             
Source: CBO and author’s calculations, see appendix.  
 
Alternatively, it would be possible to design a benefit that would allow for substantial 
reductions in state payments, coupled with modest insurance premiums or co-payments. If 
costs followed the path described in the middle scenario, the premium schedule in the MMA 
would be sufficient to allow the states to cut their contribution in half, and still save the 
federal government more than $100 billion of its projected spending on the MMA over the 
ten-year horizon. This would reduce its net expenditure on the MMA by more than one-
fourth.   
 
 
 The Savings from an Efficient Medicare Prescription Drug Plan z  12 
In the low cost scenario there would be a surplus of more than $220 billion, wh
government could devote to some other purpose. Even in the high cost scena
ich the 
rio, the 
ombination of government funding and insurance premiums would leave a relatively small 
 
c
gap to be picked up by either modest beneficiary co-payments (an average of approximately 
$5 per prescription should be sufficient to fill the gap) or small deductibles on drug expenses.   
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The CBO Estimates of Medicare Negotiated Prices  
 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, testifying in his capacity as head of the CBO, has stated that he 
believed that any savings from having Medicare negotiate prices directly with the 
harmaceutical industry would be minimal.
12 He stated that the CBO projections already 
assumed that the private insurers in the plan had secured large price reductions, so that there 
would be little possible gain from having Medicare negotiate directly with its considerably 
larger market power. 
 
This claim from CBO seems directly at odds with evidence that it has produced, showing that 
other countries (as well as the Veterans Administration) pay far lower prices for prescription 
drugs than the discounts that it assumed that private insurers could secure. Also, as noted 
earlier, CBO recognized that Medicare could exert enough market power, when acting as a 
collective buyer on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries, that it could conceivably put a 
manufacturer out of business, if it excluded it from its formulary.   
 
In making this statement, CBO did warn that political pressures may make it impossible for a 
single Medicare buyer to exert this much power. While the political power of the 
pharmaceutical industry is indeed an important factor counteracting efforts to restrict costs, it 
is important to be clear if CBO believes that the obstacle impeding a low cost drug plan is the 
political power of the industry, rather than any inherent economic obstacles.   
 
While CBO does an outstanding job in presenting non-partisan analysis on important policy 
issues, it is worth noting that it has occasionally been wrong on major issues in the past. One 
important example is its projections for capital gains tax revenue at the time when Congress 
was debating President Bush’s tax cuts in 2001. Table 6 shows the projections of capital gains 
revenue from the Budget and Economic Outlook Fiscal Years 2002-2011, which CBO issued in 
January of 2001 compared with the projections and actual tax receipts reported in the Budget 
and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006-2015. 
 
 
                                                
p
 
12 CBO, 2004c. “Estimate of the Effect of Striking the "Noninterference" Provision as Added by P.L. 108-173, 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,” Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Budget Office, [“http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4986&sequence=0]. 
…it is important 
to be clear if CBO 
believes that the 
obstacle impeding 
a low cost drug 
plan is the political 
power of the 
industry, rather 
than any inherent 
economic obstacles. 
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Table 6 
  (billions of current dollars) 
14  48  66 
2005 110  56  54 
      
s from 2001 to 
011. In its most recent projections (CBO 2005), CBO projects that total capital gains 
roject capital gains tax revenue in order to keep 
BO’s projections on a Medicare drug benefit in perspective. CBO is a tremendously 
aluable resource in policy debates; however, it is fallible. In the case of its projections on the 
potential savings from having a single buyer negotiate for Medicare, CBO cites no evidence 
to support its assertion that no substantial savings are possible. To the contrary, its own 
research suggests that there is a potential for very large savings. In the absence of any 
evidence to support its assessment, CBO’s judgment on this issue should not be accepted as 
the final word. Unless CBO can provide some reason as to why Medicare would not be able 
to accrue the same sort of savings as the Canadian government, the Australian government, 
or the Veterans Administration, those involved in the debate over designing a Medicare 
prescription drug benefit should turn to projections that are more firmly grounded in 
evidence.    
 
 
                                                




  2001 projection  2005 projection  Difference 
2001  $129   $100   $29  
2002 125  58  67 
2003 119  51  68 
2004 1
2006 107  60  47 
2007 106  65  41 
2008 106  89  17 
2009 106  82  24 
2010 108  84  24 
2011 110  97  13 
Total   $1240  $790  $450 
      
  Source: CBO and authors calculations, see appendix.  
 
CBO projected a total of $1,240 billion in capital gains tax revenue for the year
2
In the case of its 
projections on the 
potential savings 




cites no evidence to 
support its 
assertion that no 
substantial savings 
are possible.  
revenue over this period will be $790 billion, a difference of more than $450 billion. (If the 
impact of higher interest payments was included, this difference would  rise to almost $600 
billion over this 10-year budget window). If CBO had provided Congress with more accurate 
projections at the time, it is possible that Congress would have acted differently in voting on 
tax cuts that year.
13 
 




13 It was possible to recognize that the government was unlikely to see these tax revenues. The stock market was 
clearly experiencing a bubble, which was almost certain to deflate within the ten-year horizon (see Baker, D. 
ington, 
ble.pdf]).  
2002, “Letter to Dan Crippen,” [http://www.cepr.net/letters/crippen_2002_02_26.htm] and Baker, D. 2000, 
“Double Bubble: The Implications of the Over-Valuation of the Stock Market and the Dollar,” Wash
D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research [http://www.cepr.net/publications/double_bub
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Conclusion 
he M icare   by Congress in 2003 was not designed to create 
t possible prescription drug insurance for Medicare beneficiaries. As a result, 
it costs th  governm aries re t sary. If Medicare 
were allowed to negotiate directly with the drug industry, or to allow a single agent to 
negotiate on its behalf, it could purchase drugs at prices that are far lower than CBO 
projected that private insurers would pay under the system put in place in the MMA. In 
addition,  le p er of prescriptio
dollars in  stra ees that result fro
profits.  
 
An efficient Medicare drug benefit could allow for substantial savings for both the federal 
and state governments, in addition to lower cost insurance for beneficiaries. It could also 
allow for a much simpler benefit, since beneficiaries would not be forced to wade through 
details of various prescription drug plans in order to determine the best one. In this way, a 
more efficient Medicare drug benefit could allow for substantial gains all around.  
 
 
T ed Modernization Act approved
the most efficien
e ent and benefici  considerably mo han is neces
a sing rovid n drug insurance would save tens of billions of 
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Table 1 -- The baseline projection for prescription drug spending is taken from CBO 
(2004b). It uses the projection that Medicare beneficiaries would spend $1.61 trillion on 
prescription drugs over the years 2006-2013, with $1.36 trillion spent by those not covered by 
the VHA (p. 5). The growth in per capita spending is assumed to be 9.0 percent annually, 
with the Medicare population growing at approximately 2 percent annually. The top row 
shows total drug spending, while the second role shows spending minus the costs covered by 
the VHA.  
 
The lines for high cost, middle cost, and low cost project spending assume that drug prices 
he baseline 
enario and the spending path projected for high cost, middle cost and low-cost scenarios 
shown in Table 1. The projected savings for the MMA are derived from the CBO 
assumptions shown in CBO (2004b) Table 3. This table shows gross savings rising from an 
average of just under 20 percent in 2006 to 25 percent in 2013. In addition, the table shows 
additional savings of between 1.6 percent and 2.5 percent due to the rule that discounts need 
not apply to Medicaid’s Best-Price Provision. These savings are offset by projections of 
countervailing “price” and “use” effects, which increase spending on drugs. The projections 
incorporate these assumptions, interpolating the years between 2006 and 2013.  
 
Table 3 – This table shows the amount of annual administrative expenses attributable to 
marketing and profits as described in CBO 2004b, p 17 and also in CBO (2004b) Table 3. 
This number is calculated by multiplying the assumed ratios for administrative expenses in 
CBO (2004b) Table 3 (10.7 percent in 2006 and 5.6 percent in 2013), interpolating the years 
in between. 
 
Table 4 – This table sums the savings shown in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Table 5 – This table uses the projections for state payments and beneficiaries’ premiums 
found in CBO (2004b) Table 1. The projection for “gross federal payments” combines net 
new spending on MMA with the prior federal drug spending commitments shown in CBO 
(2004b) Table 1. The projected payments for drugs are taken from Table 1 above. 
 
Table 6 – This table shows projected capital gains tax revenue for the 2001-2011 budget 
horizon from the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2002-2011, Table 3-6 and from the Budget and 
Economic Outlook: 2006-2015, Table 4-3.   
 
  
are reduced by 35 percent, 55 percent, and 70 percent respectively, as discussed in the text. 
The numbers are adjusted in accordance with the assumption that these price reductions, 
respectively, lead to 15 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent, increases in drug usage.  
 
Table 2 – This table shows the difference between spending on drugs under t
sc
 